Divorce Iranian Style

Group Memo Week 4 (Lauren and Sara)

This week's readings focus on the western feminists' rhetoric towards what the laters categorize as the ‘Third world women’. Chandra Mohanty and Lila Abu-Lughod depict the dangerous generalizations that tend to be made about issues such as the veil or the role of non-western women in the family. They argue that the categorization of the ‘Woman’ as a group prior to any social relations and interactions creates a “cultural reductionism”, especially concerning non-western women, referred to through stereotypes (seen only as victims and persecuted). Thus, western feminists generalize "women's problems" from a western point of view, only applying what they consider as essential for women to ‘Third world women’ without taking into account cultural differences. Western feminists thus tend to consider ‘western feminism’ as ‘universal feminism’.

Chandra Mohanty argues that the - inaccurate - generalization of non-western women under the homogeneous and anhistoric category ‘Third world women’ leads to a misrepresentation of these women that come from very different cultural, historical and ethnical backgrounds and thus fails to tackle feminists issues in these countries. 'Woman' is seen as a category out of any social context rather than the result of a social and political construction. Such discourse also creates a hierarchy between western and ‘Third world’ women and constructs western superiority. In fact, Western feminists consider that western feminism is universal – what she calls ‘ethnocentric universalism’ – thus saying that West knowledge is superior to any other and revitalizing the colonial/ post-colonial dogmas. The author takes the example of the veil to show how such objects, considered by the West as always an oppressive symbol, can have very different significations according to the socio-economical or ethnical characteristics.

Lila Abu-Lughod focuses even more on the issue of the veil to show how western women try to talk in the place of non-western, here Arabic, women and appropriate these “women’s voices”. Even more clearly than Mohanty, Lila Abu-Lughod argues that the veil can have very different signification according to different women and that, far from always being a symbol of the male’s oppression, can be a sign of virtue or respectability. Laura Bush’s speech is especially revealing of the stereotypes and short cuts that are so often made concerning the Middle-East and especially women of this area. In her second text, Lila Abu-Lughod tries to reconcile the West and Egyptian feminisms by showing that both rejecting west feminism as an whole, both trying to import western feminism are too extreme and that Western and non-Western worlds can find some common solutions regarding women’s place in the society, in the family and the relation between family life and work.

Williams and Mahmood both take a position of defense in their writings, defending Muslim women and their freedoms from the misperceptions and misappropriations of the West, which often assume that not only are Islamic religion and practices intrinsically detrimental to women’s freedom, but also that the women who take part in them are unwilling or unconscious pawns of a greater patriarchal system. Williams defends the practice of sigheh, or temporary marriage, primarily by going on the offense. She criticizes the criteria by which the Western public judges the legitimacy and inequity of sigheh. She suggests that permanent marriage as it is known in the U.S. is a quid pro quo financial and sexual arrangement between men and women which reinforces “traditional” gender roles and hides behind a rhetoric of privacy, secularism, and progressivism. She also defends sigheh by describing it as an ambiguous term which has been misrepresented both in the West and Middle Eastern culture as an institutionalized version of prostitution. She explains the potential of sigheh for allowing women such as widows to continue living economic and sexual lives, as well as incorporating themselves once again within a family structure. Williams does not give a clear defense of how sigheh is actually utilized, but she is also somewhat unable to do so given the obscured nature of such arrangements and the unlikelihood of their being recorded.

Mahmood builds a fantastic abstract defense of Muslim womanhood, and especially pious Muslim womanhood, through a complete breakdown of how Western and non-Western scholars alike view not only Islam, but also how they create inaccurate views of oppression by defining agency only through acts of resistance. This suggests that women are always being oppressed by the culture in which they participate, and robs them of the agency that they can have by participating in cultural idioms which might, on the surface, appear to suppress their freedoms. Mahmood suggests that in fact, these idioms help to define women and give them the characteristics of subjects, which leads to agency. Mahmood also points out that the lens through which Western feminists view Muslim womanhood may also be obscured by what she calls feminism’s “dual character as both an analytical and a politically prescriptive project” (Mahmood 10). Because of this, Mahmood calls for a thorough self-analysis by Western and non-Western feminists alike of their willingness to remake other womens’ “sensibilities, life worlds, and attachments” in the name of ‘freeing’ these other women.

Discussion questions

• Where does Mohanty strike the balance between two dangerous tendency of the West : ethnocentrism universalism – seeing the world according to western values and cultural relativism?
• What aspects of the western discourse can make us think that western political leaders have a postcolonial approach of arabic countries?
• How does Lila Abu-Lughod explains the Egyptian stars ‘return to religion’ and regrets regarding their past stardom?
• How does Williams characterize the American perception of and feelings toward the institution of marriage, and how do these affect the American perception of temporary marriage in Islam?

• Mahmood’s discussion of feminism in a non-Western context questions whether the idea of feminism, or even of rights, is applicable or even accurate. Should we, as scholars, continue to analyze Muslim women even if we cannot presume to understand either their backgrounds, morals, or goals?

Quotes

• “Instead of anatycally demonstrating the production of women as socio-economic political groups within particular local contexts, this analytical move - and the presuppositions it is based of - limits the definition of the female subject to gender identity, completely bypassing social class and ethnic identity" (Mohanty, p.72)
• “In Iran, official sanction for temporary marriage is held out as evidence of the Islamic regime’s claim to modernity and as a sign of “it’s moral superiority  over the ‘decadent’ Western style of ‘free’ sexual relationships” (Williams 626)

• “the very processes and conditions that secure a subject’s subordination are also the means by which she becomes a self-conscious identity and agent” (Mahmood 17)

Week 4 Blog Post: Colonization of Non-Western Feminism

Chandra Mohanty discusses in her article "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses" the colonization of non-western feminism by western feminists. She argues that western feminists assume they understand third-world women because they belong to the "already constituted and coherent group" of "women," who hold "identical interests and desires, regardless of class, ethnic or racial location" (64). Third-world women however are assumed by most western feminists as objects rather than agents; their identity comes with being oppressed and dominated by men. By creating this static and subjugated image of the third-world, western feminists promote themselves as their superiors; they are to be looked up to, for they have control over their own bodies and have the freedom to make their own decisions. In creating this narrative for third-world women, however, many western feminists define women only by their biological gender rather than examine the different experiences women may face in their own communities, races, or socio-economic ranks. Mohanty's arguments parallel Edward Said's in Orientalism. Mohanty shows that western feminists create a discursive representation of third-world women that do not necessarily refer to material reality, but rather "sets up its own authorial subjects as the implicit referent" (64). In doing so, western feminists gain a kind of power by producing knowledge and analysis about third-world women, who are a homogeneous group with the same interests as western women but lack the means to pursue these interests.
This idea ties in well with the first of Lila Abu-Lughod's articles, which concerns itself with the wearing of the veil in Afghanistan. Women of the West assume that women in Afghanistan are publicly imprisoned by being forced into wearing the veil, a supposedly archaic and oppressive act, by the Taliban. Abu-Lughod argues that in this idea, there are two major, incorrect assumptions about Afghan women and the practice of the veil. The first ties in with Mohanty's argument: western women assume that Afghan women have the same interests as they do. Therefore, Afghan women must want "freedom" of choice in their dress, which would inherently mean the rejection of a symbol of oppression. She argues that we must accept the possibility of difference; "can we accept that might be different ideas about justice and that different women might want, or choose, different futures from what we envision as best?" (788)
The second assumption is that the veil is inherently a symbol of oppression. Abu-Lughod points out that "veiling itself must not be confused with, or made to stand for, lack of agency" (786). Even without the Taliban's regulations, many women would choose to cover themselves in some fashion, as a sign of modesty and dignity, as well as a way to avoid unwanted male attention. Many women wear burqas or other forms of covering for subjective religious experiences, to bring them closer to God. Abu-Lughod's article end with an image very similar to Alloula's in "Women's Prisons." She describes an invitation to a reception she received from Doctors of the World that described how Afghan women would remove their burqas to receive medical treatment, and in doing so achieved "a sort of intimacy" with their doctors (789). What Abu-Lughod describes as "fantasies of unveiling" assumes that Afghan women are imprisoned, much like the Algerian women depicted in the postcards Alloula analyzes, and revealing themselves to their doctors was liberating and dignifying.
Juliet A. Williams's article challenges two aspects of western rhetoric regarding the Middle East and specifically Muslim practices: that there is a large difference between the actual marriage practices of the West and the Middle East, and that marital practices of the Middle East in comparison to those of the West are perverse and exotic. She argues that temporary marriage is not so dissimilar to marriage in the U.S., where 50 percent of marriages end in divorce, and prenuptial agreements "device strategies for efficiently uncoupling," which inherently implies that a split is likely and marriage is not necessarily permanent (627). Additionally she states that due to economic inequalities between men and women, marriage in the United States is "a form of socially sanctioned prostitution, in which a woman provides a man with virtually unlimited right to sexual access in exchange for financial protection and security" (627).
I have several problems with this view point, the biggest of these being denying women's sexual agency in marriage. It discounts that women may sexually benefit from marriage as well, somewhat discounting women as beings with sexual desires, and that sexual access is only desired by men. It also reduces men's desires in marriage only to sexual access. It additionally implies that men are easy to access sexually, while women are difficult; while not said explicitly, it seems to imply men are willing to engage in sexual acts with a willing partner, while women seem to require a willing partner, financial compensation, and the legal promise of fidelity and companionship encompassed in marriage.
Williams does however bring up an interesting point about why the idea of temporary marriage disturbs many westerners; in the West, people supposedly believe that sexually intimate relationships are a matter of individual choice and not officially institutionalized. This reminds me of one case in Divorce Iranian Style, in which one woman wished to get a divorce because her husband was proclaimed to be sterile. The documentary states that in cases of sexual incompetence, women have legal grounds for divorce. In this way it seems that another private matter, such as infertility and impotence have been given a status of official policy. Williams points out that marital policy in the U.S. promotes heterosexual sexual interaction by politicizing sexual orientation, which makes official what many deem individual choice.

Generalizations on Islam, women and human nature

Generalizations

I was particularly intrigued this week by the common thread through all the readings that it is a mistake to assume that all people (women in particular) have an innate desire for “freedom” in some context, whether positive or negative. Mohanty  criticizes author Perdita Huston for assuming “that all third-world women have similar problems and needs. Thus, they must have similar interests and goals.” (140) Huston’s assumption is that said “third-world women” place “family, dignity and service to others” above all else, deprioritizing personal freedoms. However, those same values are commonly shared by Western women as well, Mohanty points out. Mohanty argues that social class and ethnic identity should also play a role in this discourse, ideas that are often neglected by the “cultural reductionism” of many scholarly authors and analysts.

                The idea that Muslim women have the same desires and needs as Western women because all women are inherently the same is perpetuated by Laura Bush’s speech, which is discussed in Lila Abu-Lughod’s “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural Relativism and Its Others”.  After the Sept. 11 attacks, Bush made a speech that Abu-Lughod asserts “reinforced chasmic divides, primarily between the ‘civilized people throughout the world’ whose hearts break for the women and children of Afghanistan and the Taliban-and-the-terrorists, the cultural monsters who want to, as she put it, ‘impose their world on the rest of us.’” (158)

 Who decides that Westerners or those who agree with Western ideals are the “civilized”? Am I, as a Christian Western woman, so different from a Muslim woman that I must save her from her own culture? Are we so similar that we both want to be free from oppression, dominance or subordination as society defines them?

Saba Mahmood sums up my feelings on the generalizations many scholars make about human nature as often used to explain the “plight of the Muslim woman”.

“If we recognize that the desire for freedom from, or subversion of, norms is not an innate desire that motivates all beings at all times, but is also profoundly mediated by cultural and historical conditions…”

Not everyone prioritizes “freedom” above all else, just like not every person wants to settle down, not every person wants to stay at home taking care of children, not every person wants to go to college, etc. What we’re told is right to want isn’t always what we want.

On Western ideas being discussed in Iranian culture:
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/01/25/iran_faces_backlash_over_morality_police_spying_on_coffee_shops.html

Week 4: The Loss of Agency Through the Western Lens

            In this week’s readings, each author attempts to problematize the nature of European/so-called “Western” feminist scholarship and thought about non-European women. They question mainstream feminist works and ideology, namely the movement’s ideas that non-European women need Caucasian lady saviors, have no agency of their own, and constitute one, homogeneous group with no unique differences across ethnic/cultural/class lines. However, in reality, non-European women rarely fit the tight mold of the ‘third-world woman’ that their European counterparts have fashioned for them.

            In Chandra Mohanty’s “Under Feminist Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,” she illustrates how white feminist discourse on the alleged third-world woman propagates myths about non-European women and reinforces an Orientalist/colonial hierarchy and discourse. She attacks three foundational faults of this feminist scholarship. First, she states that the idea that women, no matter their cultural and historical context, make up one coherent population group who share the same desires and oppressive situations is reductive and “implies a notion of gender or sexual difference or even patriarchy which can be applied universally and cross-culturally” (64). Second, the evidence often presented to prove universality exists among women is usually minimal at best. Her third and final core complaint is that in becoming the definition forgers of what constitutes a third-world woman, Western feminists are also given the power to define themselves, which reinforces colonial notions of superiority of the West, specifically Europe.

            In their so-called benevolent mission to bring justice to the burqa-clad women of the world, European feminists often view third-world women as one singular group whose experiences are generally the same. According to Mohanty, the identity of this group is often articulated in terms of how the women are objects; the only way in which these women are discussed is usually by how they are “affected” by other, namely male, actors. This alone strips any agency away from non-European women. They frame women as victims of patriarchy and dependent beings, but in reality, this framework serves to objectify non-European women, disregards historical/cultural/colonial heritage, and forgets that “women” are often created and developed through social interaction and practice. Finally, one of Mohanty’s most interesting points is that by defining non-European women as powerless, oppressed, and traditional, Western feminists also in effect define themselves. Their language reinforces the colonial hierarchy where those in the West are far more superior and advanced than those outside that sphere. Through this problematic scholarship, “we see how western feminists alone become the true ‘subjects ‘of this counter-history. Third-world women, on the other hand, never rise above the debilitating generality of their ‘object’ status” (79). Thus, the third-world woman’s agency is erased to elevate the status of the Western feminist.

            In Lila Abu-Lughod’s pieces, she shows how female agency of non-European women often becomes the subject of political debates in both their home countries and the international community. In “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving?” she shows how U.S. politicians co-opted the issues of Afghani women to further their political agendas on intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11. Instead of talking about how U.S. foreign policy helped support regimes in other parts of the world, politicians like George W. Bush stated the U.S needed to invade Afghanistan in order to save ‘women of cover’ from the oppressive Taliban regime. Abu-Lughod says this type of colonial feminism is ultimately dangerous for it often involves spreading and using false information about cultural practices (like reducing all Muslim women’s problems to the veil) and puts forth the idea that non-European women once again need saving by the Westerners who were previously the colonial masterminds of the world. Abu-Lughod’s other article focuses more on Egypt, which she claims is a good model of the fact that while some governments in non-European countries view Western feminism as a dangerous import, “those who claim to reject feminist ideals as Western imports actually practice a form of selective repudiation that depends on significant occlusions” (243). Her biggest point that really resonated with me was her idea that instead of linking the traditional roles of women as mother and wife to Islam, she sees this theory and its application’s origin in the import of Western ideologies like capitalism. For example, Qasim Amin, who is often seen as the father of Egyptian feminism, borrowed his ideas that women should be devoted to their families and to their social status from middle-class, bourgeois values of the capitalist West. He called for “a liberation of women that would make them good bourgeois wives and mothers in a world where state and class ties would override those of kin, capitalist organization would divide the world into the distinct spheres of private and public” (261). Therefore, the non-European and European worlds do share some of the same ideologies when it comes to the role of women.

            The European view of female agency is highlighted in both Juliet A. Williams’ study on temporary marriage in Iran and Saba Mahmood’s “The Subject of Freedom.” In Williams’ piece on temporary marriage, she shows how the concept of Iranian temporary marriage, although portrayed as backwards in U.S. media, is actually quite similar to U.S. marriage practices. Some similarities are that U.S. marriages are considerably short if you look at national divorce rates; because of historic inequalities, some U.S. women also exchange sexual resources in marriages for financial security; and the U.S. government is involved in issues of marriage and reproduction as much as the Iranian government. Finally, in Mahmood’s piece, she uses the women’s mosque movement to interrogate readily accepted definitions of agency and what constitutes as resistance to oppression. She argues “we should keep the meaning of agency open…the concept of agency should be delinked from the goals of progressive politics, a tethering that has often led to the incarceration of the notion of agency within the trope of resistance against oppressive and dominating operations of power” (34). Therefore, when women take control over teaching the Quran and other religious texts of Islam to other women, this in itself is a form of resistance. What all of this week’s readings suggest is that instead of the West defining and attempting to save non-European women, we need more non-European women to possess the opportunity to represent and speak for themselves. However, I have one question that still went unanswered. What if cultural practices, in either European or non-European countries, do infringe on the rights of women? How does either international actor respond, or do we just turn our head away from human rights violations in other parts of the world? And how do we address this if even our conception of “rights” is the Western definition of rights?

For outside sources, I have included the following links:

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/27/womens-vote-2012-election_n_1832825.html

The 2012 presidential election was an excellent example to reinforce Juliet Williams’ idea that the West, specifically the United States, is not that different from countries like Iran when it comes to governmental intervention into the sex lives of its people, especially women. How is the U.S. any different from Iran, who promoted the idea of temporary marriage, when our politicians constantly argue about the legality and morality of abortion, gay marriage, access to contraception and other reproductive resources, etc?

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/opinion/sunday/women-fight-to-define-the-arab-spring.html?_r=0

In this New York Times article, the agency and aspirations of women are highlighted, which is a refreshing change from the usual dialogue of the oppressed women of the Middle East. However, there are some pieces of very problematic language, such as the following:

·      “Women in Arab countries have long lagged behind those in other countries in terms of opportunities and leadership positions in politics and business, and this has hurt the region’s overall progress”

·      “In Tunisia, the most Western and liberal of the Muslim countries, women won 49 of the 217 Constituent Assembly seats in last year’s election.”

The first sentence is problematic because like our readings have shown, this language does not explore the historical or cultural context of why women in Arab countries may be “lagging” behind. Another problem is that the journalist grouped women of Arab countries in one category. It also implies through mere face value that the women are lagging behind because of their own fault. The second sentence is problematic because it is basically saying that Western ideals are the highest values of the world and since Tunisia incorporates some of these so-called ideals, they have shown greater success in electing more women. This sentence demonstrates the ethnocentrism of Western media outlets.

http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2002/04/afghan-girl/index-text

Although I personally love this famous photograph, it does unfortunately exoticize the girl a bit since it is only a portrait, which rips her out of her historical and cultural context, and focuses on her beauty. The way the photographer is introduced in the story is also very sensual, and reminds me of Alloula’s article on postcards, where the photographer is allowed to penetrate the hidden world of women in countries like Afghanistan. The article itself focuses on the Western perceptions of the woman, reduces the ‘Afghan girl’ to a mere object, and doesn’t take her claims that she liked wearing the veil and living under the Taliban was better seriously. This is a grave offense because instead of allowing her to speak for herself or even respect her wishes to not answer questions, the article focused on how she was being interpreted and defined by the writer and photographer.

Week 3 Blog Post

Mernissi begins her book explaining that it is a "narrative of recollection"- a piece looking into the nooks and crannies of history that have been untouched.  She focuses primarily on A'isha and the heritage of the Hadith, "Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity".  She draws back to the Companion, Abu Bakra, who recalled this Hadith upon A'isha's declaration of civil war.  Mernissi, however, provides context for the Hadith, making it a bit more understandable than just an absurd, sexist Islam tradition.  She explains that A'isha was the first to bring on a civil war since the Prophet's death and that many wanted to remain neutral in a confusing situation.  She further explains, "many of the Companions and inhabitants of Basra chose neutrality in the conflict, only Abu Bakra justified it by the fact that one of the parties was a woman" (57). She goes on to explain the respect other men had for A'isha, her gender not being an issue- questioning the validity of Abu Bakra's Hadith.  She then goes onto explain the rigor necessary for the Hadith to be valid, eventually disproving Abu Bakra's claim as valid.  However, Mernissi goes onto explain that while several misogynistic claims are refuted by the rules of viewing Islam as science, they still exist as Hadith. 
The final chapter discusses the origin of the hijab.  Mernissi explains its first use as a curtain to draw out unwanted guests at the Prophet's wedding celebration, and goes on to give the historical context for the sudden separation it created.  She goes on to discuss the linguistic implications of "hijab" and its many dimensions.
After reading the chapters, I still felt the question that remained was why these traditions still exist.   She gave proof for why they should not be taken as truisms, but they still are- even though she spends time to prove the Hadith invalid.  She provides a good amount of background that gives the reader an unbiased view of both sides of the issue regarding the Civil War with A'isha, which is very successful in disproving the Hadith.  Yet the renouncement of the Hadith seems more of a small, personal victory than a call for change.  It seemed as if the writing got so caught up in the historical element that she lost what she vehemently set out for in the introduction.  The chapter on the hijab also raised many questions for me.  She explains the paradox- that the hijab which separates "you from the prince is to be respected, the one thatseparates you from God should be destroyed" (96).  It is a sign of shame or distance from God in the Koran, but also acts as almost a badge for Muslim women.  I still felt lost as how this transition happened.  Having spoken to Muslim women who were hijabs and those who do not raise even more questions of how it has become a sort of symbol for Muslim women that some find peace in wearing and others do not.  Of course it is a choice and based on individual preferences, but I still wonder how it even came to be such an important choice.

Lara and Chris, memo for week 3

             Mernissi’s work intervenes in the interpretation of Muslim religious texts to show how their legacy has been shaped by a persistent misogynistic bias, what she calls structural manipulation of Muslim traditions. Mernissi focuses on the access to interpreting history, reserved for mullahs and imams and overwhelmingly male. She sees Islamic interpretations as often patriarchal and false, and instead looks for a new, more equitable interpretation (such as Wa’dud’s). Mernissi is interested in how misogyny has arisen not from “God or Muhammad” but from human (male) action; a “fabrication of false traditions” (page 9).* To do this, Mernissi engages critically with the historical record on Muslim religious texts, specifically those which have become consequential to norms about women in Islam.

              For instance, the first chapter in the course packet focuses on one specific hadith which has become “omnipresent and all-embracing” when discussions about women in politics come up, that says “Those who entrust their affairs to a woman will never know prosperity.” Rather than taking this as a given, a principle of the religion, Mernissi examines the historical/biographical/religious records  relating to this hadith, looking for how the singular circumstance of its pronouncement might challenge its current status as a “universal wisdom” to be manipulated as its interlocutors see fit. The Hadith was pronounced by Abu Bakra, who Mernissi demonstrates to be unfit as a source of hadith according to traditional standards of citation in Muslim religious science (for example, having been convicted of false testimony by Caliph ‘Umar) and misogynistic, immoral, and prone to politicized hadith-reciting besides.

              Mernissi’s last section looks at verse 53 of sura 33, to which scholars trace the first moment of the hijab in Muslim society. She elaborates on the very specific circumstances of this moment (Muhammad’s rare break in patience in leaving behind lingering guests at his wedding party; furthermore the high tension of the year 5, when Muhammad led the Medinans/Muslims to war against the Meccans, a moment when the Muslims could have been defeate decisively) and how it became such a consequential moment. Furthermore, Mernissi is interested in how a nuanced (and negative) etymological stem such as the hijab, which plays a crucial role in many strains of Muslim thought, has been popularized as a positive, identity-affirming garment in contemporary societies. The last few pages of the chapter deal with the republication (in Morocco, presumably) of several highly conservative religious texts, from authors old and new. The works insist that women stay in a subordinate position in society, which shows that the specially male access to interpretation continues.

*All citations are from Mernissi’s own book, not the course pack.

Questions for discussion:

1.      Is there a way to bring about full political equality without minimizing the impact of hadiths as a current and relevant document? How/why is Quranic interpretation an important avenue for Islamic feminisms?

2.      What avenues, if any, are available for bringing about more women-led interpretation of religious documents?

3.      How has the original purpose of the hijab transformed into popular stereotypes today?

Quotable quotes:

“But can one ever “simply” read a text in which politics and the sacred are joined and mingled to the point of becoming indistinguishable from each other? It is not just the present that the imams and politicians want to manage to assure our well-being as Muslims, but above all the past that is being strictly supervised and completely managed for all of us, me and women. What is being supervised and managed, in fact, is memory and history…This book is intended to be a narrative of recollection, gliding toward the areas where memory breaks down, dates get mixed up, and events softly blur together, as in the dreams from which we draw our strength.” Page 10.

“So it is strange indeed to observe the modern course of this concept [of the hijab], which from the beginning had such a strongly negative connotation in the Koran. The very sign of the person who is damned, excluded from the privileges and spiritual grace to which the Muslim has access, is claimed in our day as a symbol of Muslim identity, manna for the Muslim women.” Page 97.