Chandra Mohanty discusses in her article "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses" the colonization of non-western feminism by western feminists. She argues that western feminists assume they understand third-world women because they belong to the "already constituted and coherent group" of "women," who hold "identical interests and desires, regardless of class, ethnic or racial location" (64). Third-world women however are assumed by most western feminists as objects rather than agents; their identity comes with being oppressed and dominated by men. By creating this static and subjugated image of the third-world, western feminists promote themselves as their superiors; they are to be looked up to, for they have control over their own bodies and have the freedom to make their own decisions. In creating this narrative for third-world women, however, many western feminists define women only by their biological gender rather than examine the different experiences women may face in their own communities, races, or socio-economic ranks. Mohanty's arguments parallel Edward Said's in Orientalism. Mohanty shows that western feminists create a discursive representation of third-world women that do not necessarily refer to material reality, but rather "sets up its own authorial subjects as the implicit referent" (64). In doing so, western feminists gain a kind of power by producing knowledge and analysis about third-world women, who are a homogeneous group with the same interests as western women but lack the means to pursue these interests.
This idea ties in well with the first of Lila Abu-Lughod's articles, which concerns itself with the wearing of the veil in Afghanistan. Women of the West assume that women in Afghanistan are publicly imprisoned by being forced into wearing the veil, a supposedly archaic and oppressive act, by the Taliban. Abu-Lughod argues that in this idea, there are two major, incorrect assumptions about Afghan women and the practice of the veil. The first ties in with Mohanty's argument: western women assume that Afghan women have the same interests as they do. Therefore, Afghan women must want "freedom" of choice in their dress, which would inherently mean the rejection of a symbol of oppression. She argues that we must accept the possibility of difference; "can we accept that might be different ideas about justice and that different women might want, or choose, different futures from what we envision as best?" (788)
The second assumption is that the veil is inherently a symbol of oppression. Abu-Lughod points out that "veiling itself must not be confused with, or made to stand for, lack of agency" (786). Even without the Taliban's regulations, many women would choose to cover themselves in some fashion, as a sign of modesty and dignity, as well as a way to avoid unwanted male attention. Many women wear burqas or other forms of covering for subjective religious experiences, to bring them closer to God. Abu-Lughod's article end with an image very similar to Alloula's in "Women's Prisons." She describes an invitation to a reception she received from Doctors of the World that described how Afghan women would remove their burqas to receive medical treatment, and in doing so achieved "a sort of intimacy" with their doctors (789). What Abu-Lughod describes as "fantasies of unveiling" assumes that Afghan women are imprisoned, much like the Algerian women depicted in the postcards Alloula analyzes, and revealing themselves to their doctors was liberating and dignifying.
Juliet A. Williams's article challenges two aspects of western rhetoric regarding the Middle East and specifically Muslim practices: that there is a large difference between the actual marriage practices of the West and the Middle East, and that marital practices of the Middle East in comparison to those of the West are perverse and exotic. She argues that temporary marriage is not so dissimilar to marriage in the U.S., where 50 percent of marriages end in divorce, and prenuptial agreements "device strategies for efficiently uncoupling," which inherently implies that a split is likely and marriage is not necessarily permanent (627). Additionally she states that due to economic inequalities between men and women, marriage in the United States is "a form of socially sanctioned prostitution, in which a woman provides a man with virtually unlimited right to sexual access in exchange for financial protection and security" (627).
I have several problems with this view point, the biggest of these being denying women's sexual agency in marriage. It discounts that women may sexually benefit from marriage as well, somewhat discounting women as beings with sexual desires, and that sexual access is only desired by men. It also reduces men's desires in marriage only to sexual access. It additionally implies that men are easy to access sexually, while women are difficult; while not said explicitly, it seems to imply men are willing to engage in sexual acts with a willing partner, while women seem to require a willing partner, financial compensation, and the legal promise of fidelity and companionship encompassed in marriage.
Williams does however bring up an interesting point about why the idea of temporary marriage disturbs many westerners; in the West, people supposedly believe that sexually intimate relationships are a matter of individual choice and not officially institutionalized. This reminds me of one case in Divorce Iranian Style, in which one woman wished to get a divorce because her husband was proclaimed to be sterile. The documentary states that in cases of sexual incompetence, women have legal grounds for divorce. In this way it seems that another private matter, such as infertility and impotence have been given a status of official policy. Williams points out that marital policy in the U.S. promotes heterosexual sexual interaction by politicizing sexual orientation, which makes official what many deem individual choice.
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