If last week’s assignment The Will Not To Know proves far too
general/essentializing in its treatment of “Islamic homosexualities” across
times and countries, this week’s reading provides more fine-grained studies of
how individual states negotiated biopolitics during given historical periods.
Joseph Suad’s work in particular interested me because of his search for
“empirical foundations for comparative and theoretical endeavors” (176) in
spite of the failings of works like the Murray and Roscoe. The “big point” that
Suad makes is the different manifestation of biopolitics in Lebanon and Iraq,
as part of a struggle between “primordial,” family-based politics (visible
especially in Lebanon) and nationalist, unifying politics (as typical of Ba’thist
Iraq). Suad makes the compelling point that Iraq deployed many more programs
for interpolating nationalist subjectivity in Iraqi women than Lebanon managed
in its confessionalist politics. However, I do wonder if Suad risks reducing
politics here to a struggle between localist/patronage networks and
centralized, national sentiment and bureaucracy. In the same way that
depicting, for instance, European history as a straight, progressive line from
feudal states to constitutionalist nation-states, I think a critical reading
should look for the peculiarities of “primordial” politics in Lebanon and Iraq
alongside this “nationalist vs. primordialist” dichotomy. In addition, I
thought the absence of discussion about the Lebanese civil war or the Iraq-Iran
war noteworthy. Finally, I can’t help mentioning how surreal it is to read
about Iraq (and, to a lesser extent, Lebanon) before the wars that have
occurred recently, which, I imagine, has changed these countries in big ways.
I found
Amar’s article on securitization very stimulating too, above all because of the
vocabulary that he brings together there to talk about the nexus of
biopolitics, nationalism, media studies, and postcolonial themes. Starting from
a sketch of the Western media’s reception of Tahrir Square and the Egyptian
Revolution, Amar describes the state of “hypervisibility,” the state of
attention and regulation of colonized bodies, in Egypt, where the intervention
of Western media and NGOs (quasi-private imperialism instead of the 19th
c.’s state-centered imperialism) puts pressure on the Orientalized “Arab
street.” Western attempts to enforce progressive gender politics in that
context taps into a delicate political balance between the Mubarak regime’s
thugs and his opponents; the media’s take on the street, inevitably one site of
pushback against the state, shames lower-class men seen as reactionary and
sexually predatory, and whose hypervisibility pushes them to accede to accede
to classist narratives of respectability. Amar, aware of the space documented
by Mahmood for agentive adherence to these norms, demonstrates again the
co-production (along Stoler’s lines) of race, gender, class, and sexuality in
modern Egypt. The article, then, has definitely changed how I think about these topics by giving me a more critical vocabulary with which to talk about them. In addition, I found Amar’s article very
pertinent to how we today must think our role as consumers of media in general, which
serves in many cases to dismiss difficult ethical or representational difficulties.
The Kony 2012 campaign provides a
similar example of the media’s capacity for “hypervisibility” and the
securitization of parahumans, even if its deficiencies have been intensely
discussed, and its somewhat-tangential relation to Gender, Islam, and
Sexuality. Kony and the LRA still provide excellent targets as People Who Are
Not White Americans and whose problems might be fixed if only enough Westerners
circulate their benevolence on Facebook. The problem, then, becomes one of pushing back against media that seeks to cut off and solve intractable issues of communication and representation.
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