This week’s readings
focus on masculinity in the Arab world, using Egypt as the key example. Jacob’s
chapter “Geneology” explores effendi, the
idea of masculinity stemming from nationalism, and the story of Mustafa Kamil
as a new ideal for Egyptian men. The term effendi was known
as the “English equivalent of gentleman” and connoted a “rise above historical
obscurity and the faceless mass of ordinary subjects” (45-46) until British
colonial rule. In England in Egypt,
Alfred Milner characterized the colonial effendi as having a “general air of
dinginess and servility” (46). He suggested that the restructuring of Egyptian
masculinity would come from erasing qualities such as what he referred to as
the “Oriental combination of servility to those above, and arrogance to those
beneath them” (48).
Indeed,
Jacobs brings up colonialism as major contributing factor to the apparent
failings of Egyptian masculinity. Farid wrote, a great man is a “nationalist
who inspires others to become nationalists,” adding that “the ability to win
hearts and minds over to the nationalist cause made for a great man.” (51). It’s
interesting that he made that connection between the two characteristics and
countered the tradition connection of a “conqueror” or “warrior” with
manliness. The writer contrasts two writers on this topic. Charles François
Marie in L’Egypte et Les Egyptiens
tries to support the continuation of British influence based on the assumption
that the Egyptians lacked national feeling and therefore manliness from “centuries
of submission to foreign conquerors” (59). It’s an interesting although
offensive argument that tries to tie Egyptian men’s manliness directly to the
country’s history of colonial rule and makes a case for continuing this rule in
order to “change” the men back. Qasim Amin’s Les Egyptiens, although a critique of Marie’s work, still “implicitly
places the blame for any deficit in contemporary Egyptian masculinity squarely
on the shoulders of the British occupiers” (60). In addition, Amin writes from a European
standpoint and romanticizes the Egyptian peasant man as being simple, hardworking
and uncomplaining.
Mustafa
Kamil was touted as the new ideal for Egyptian masculinity. He was described
poetically as being a “powerful phoenix rising from the ashes of a once majestic
culture to reclaim for it its lost glory, honor, and freedom” (53). Jacobs
outlines a few virtues that a “great man” is supposed to possess which include a
powerful will, power of oration, and a clear and effective use of language” (52).
Indeed, Farid writes that “the loudness and clarity of [Kamil’s] voice were key
elements of his greatness,” especially the fact that it was “employed in both
Egypt and Europe” (53)
Inhorn’s article on “Male
Infertility and Stigma in Egypt and Lebanon” argues that male infertility is
linked with issues relating to sexuality and therefore stigmatizes infertile
males as unable to prove their “virility, paternity, and manhood” (163).
Although treatment is available and can be effective, Inhorn adds that “the very
technologies designed to overcome [infertility] add additional layers of stigma
and cultural complexity” (163). For example, some men were worried that a child
would be stigmatized if its “test tube origins” were found out. In addition,
some thought that the procedure was sinful because of potential mixing of donor
gametes (175).
Inhorn’s studies, which
took place in Egypt and Lebanon, focused on infertility rates in IVF centers.
Inhorn was worried about getting accurate information about men’s infertility. “Men
in the Middle East (and beyond may deem paternity an important achievement and
a major source of their masculine identity” (169). She touched on the shame
that many men experience, citing the example of Ali who blamed a quickly
treated sexually transmitted infection for his infertility instead of a bad
smoking habit (168).
The study tries to make
a case for differences between how Egyptian and Lebanese men in perceive
infertility. She writes that an Egyptian man would feel “ana mish raagil – “I am not a man” – if others were to know that he
was the cause of a given infertility problem” (170). In contrast, she found
that the Lebanese men in her study did not equate infertility with a lack of
manliness. However, Inhorn acknowledges that this finding could have been due
to a high nonresponse rate and the fact that “those who did agree to
participate were probably the ones who felt least diminished by their
infertility” (172). I believe that the relatively high nonresponse rate could
have easily led to a non-representative sample of Lebanon’s population, and
that therefore Inhorn’s conclusion may be erroneous.
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